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Local determinants of crime: Do military bases matter? 
Alfredo R. Paloyo
1 
Colin Vance
2 
Matthias Vorell
3 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
The majority of crime is committed by young men, and young men comprise the 
majority of the military-base population. The confluence of these two empirical 
regularities invites a scientific look at the contribution of a military base to criminal 
activity in its geographic periphery. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
We estimate the impact on criminal activity of the massive base realignments and 
closures that occurred in Germany for the period 2003–2007. In particular, we examine 
breaking and entering, automobile-related crime, violent crime, and drug-related crime. 
 
METHODS 
We use a fixed-effect model to account for time-invariant unobservable elements in a 
panel of 298 military bases. We also take advantage of geographic information system 
software to mitigate issues arising from the spatial nature of the dataset. 
 
RESULTS 
The estimates indicate that the base realignments and closures did not have a significant 
impact on criminal activity surrounding bases. Traditional correlates of crime remain 
statistically significant in our specifications. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although crime is largely committed by young men, we find that the closure of military 
bases, which are staffed primarily by young men, does not have an impact on criminal 
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activity. For matters of regional policy, we find that arguments pertaining to criminal 
activity generated by military bases are not supported by data. 
 
COMMENTS 
Economic wellbeing, as measured by real GNP and relative disposable income, is 
negatively associated with crime. Higher unemployment has a positive association. 
Regions with higher percentage of foreigners also have higher levels of crime. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Against the backdrop of the transformation of the German Federal Defense Forces, we 
examine the socioeconomic impact of military bases on the surrounding communities. 
In particular, we focus on the effects of military bases and military personnel on the 
level of crime in the surrounding area. The realignment of the German Federal Defense 
Forces gives us a unique opportunity to use a natural experiment to estimate the causal 
impact of military base closures on crime. 
While the cost of military base closures is usually estimated in terms of its impact 
on regional output (see, for instance, Paloyo et al. 2010), a full accounting of the costs 
must include social costs, such as crime. In this paper, we attempt to capture this 
particular aspect of base closures. Others have also recognized the importance of 
estimating these indirect impacts (e.g., Thanner 2006; aus dem Moore 2012).
4 In the 
pursuit of quantifying the impact on criminal activity around the base, we also aim to 
document the typical covariates of crime, such as legal economic opportunities (as 
indicated by, say, household income and regional output), the percentage of foreigners, 
and the percentage of young adults. 
Military service and crime have long been linked in the literature. There is ample 
evidence that conscription could lead men to commit crimes in the future, and Germany 
just recently abolished compulsory military service. For example, using a natural 
experiment in the assignment of draft-eligibility status through a lottery system in 
Argentina, Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrodsky (2011) find that participation in military 
service increases the likelihood of having a criminal record in the future, particularly 
when the crime involves weapons. Lindo and Stoecker (2014)  demonstrate that 
“military service increases the probability of incarceration for a violent crime” although 
it does seem to have an opposite effect for the probability of incarceration for a 
nonviolent crime. Violent acts also increased for combat-exposed Vietnam veterans, 
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particularly for blacks (Rohlfs 2010).
5 It is therefore conceivable that military personnel 
could have an impact on the level of crime observed around the base’s surroundings. 
Being involved in the military can increase the likelihood of engaging in criminal 
activity for a variety of reasons. Psychologically, the most obvious is perhaps the 
exposure to extremely stressful situations, including intensive training and combat. 
Exposure to combat, in particular, can elicit a stress reaction ‒ combat fatigue ‒ that is 
widely reported to be a leading cause for post-traumatic stress disorders among soldiers 
and veterans. Because of the military training, access costs associated with weapons are 
much lower for military personnel. For instance, knowledge of operation of a pistol or 
rifle is immediately provided. 
Moreover, soldiers are removed from their usual social environment and are 
expected to rapidly conform to the culture within the military as an institution. This 
causes an enormous amount of stress. Much of the training occurs in an exclusive 
environment or social milieu that is, by nature, prone to a violent response. As an 
isolated and insulated institution, peer effects can be expected to manifest themselves 
much more strongly, amplifying negative attitudes that may arise out of a masculine 
military environment. 
The impact of military service has also been shown to be generally negative for the 
labor-market performance of veterans.
6  This is because of  a variety of reasons, 
including the depreciation of their human capital while in service and their delayed 
entry in the civilian labor market. Due to this inferior economic situation, engaging in 
criminal activity might become an attractive alternative for this group of individuals. 
Finally, at the aggregate level, the variation in the level of criminal activity can be 
attributed mechanically to the reduction in the pool of potential criminal offenders when 
a military base shuts down or reduces its personnel complement. Since personnel are 
typically relocated, there are simply fewer people to commit  crime. The data, described 
below, allow us to observe this at a particular geographic level of aggregation, at the 
cost of not being able to identify exactly which person (military serviceman or not) 
committed the crime. 
Crime is a complex social phenomenon that deserves special focus from social 
scientists. Various aspects of crime have been examined by psychologists, sociologists, 
lawyers, political scientists,  and, beginning with the work of Becker (1968) and its 
extension by Ehrlich (1973), by economists as well. Applications of economic theories 
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labor-market performance. The sample of men then, of course, is much different from the stock of soldiers in 
this study. Paloyo, Vance & Vorell: Local determinants of crime: Do military bases matter? 
628    http://www.demographic-research.org 
of rational choice tend to explain the observed trends in deviant behavior quite well.
7 
For example, changes in the economic milieu ‒ as can potentially happen with the 
closure of a military base ‒ have been shown to have an impact on criminal activity. 
Bushway et al. (2012) list four reasons that relate poor economic situations to crime: 
reduction in opportunities for legitimate economic activities, reduction in criminal 
opportunities (poorer people tend to be robbed less, for example), reduction in the 
consumption of drugs and alcohol (to the extent that these are related to crime), and the 
reduction in the probability of prosecution and incarceration. 
The sociology of deviant behavior also has much to say about the emergence of a 
criminal. A prominent sociological theory to explain crime is “strain theory”, which is 
related to the concept of “anomie” (Merton 1949). Anomie refers to the situation where 
cultural norms for an individual or group change or break down completely. Some 
sociologists use this theory to explain why crime or deviant-behavior rates differ 
between subgroups of a population. If a group sees certain kinds of behavior as valid or 
an acceptable means to reach a predefined goal, this can change individual behavior. 
When an individual can no longer reach his goals by conventional means, he has to 
adapt and act differently. These changes can include a move toward criminal or deviant 
activities. Individuals conform to existing group behavior, which may be socially (and, 
in this case, legally) unacceptable, and follow existing “rituals”. While it seems 
probable that grouping young men together may lead to deviant behavior through group 
dynamics (e.g., gangs), the strength of peer-group influence is still to be established in 
the sociological literature on crime. Existing evidence suggests that while peers may 
facilitate deviant behavior, self-selection into those groups plays an important role as 
well (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). 
Much of the attention on studies of crime is justified by the sheer magnitude of 
criminal activities and its associated social costs. Take the case of a burglary. One needs 
to keep in mind that the costs of such a legal breach are not borne simply by the victim. 
There are also law-enforcement costs related to determining and apprehending the 
suspect, as well as the cost of having police personnel in the first place to prevent such 
crimes. Upon arrest, the legal system also comes into play: lawyers’ fees must be paid 
as well as judges’ salaries. In jurisdictions with juries, the opportunity costs of members 
of the jury must also be taken into account. Moreover, there is the expected response of 
the victim and  her neighbors, who will now presumably undertake more security 
measures such as installing electronic anti-burglary  systems or safer windows. 
Considering the number of crimes committed every year, the associated annual total so-
cial cost would be staggering  ‒  and this is even without acknowledging the non-
pecuniary costs of victimization, such as psychological stress. As a rough measure, 
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Table 1 presents the direct cost of crime as estimated by the Federal Criminal Police 
Office in Germany. 
 
Table 1:  Cost of crime (Germany, 2001‒2009) 
Year  Amount (in billion EUR)  As share of nominal GDP (in %) 
2001  10.927  0.52 
2002  9.836  0.46 
2003  11.931  0.55 
2004  10.431  0.47 
2005  8.418  0.38 
2006  8.190  0.35 
2007  8.042  0.33 
2008  9.960  0.40 
2009  7.198  0.30 
 
Source: Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik: Bundeskriminalamt (2009) and Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (2010). 
 
 
Despite having one of the lowest national crime rates ‒ even for Western European 
standards ‒ the federal government of Germany has been consciously addressing the 
issue of criminality within its borders. The contribution of this study is to examine the 
effects of the programmed military base realignments and closures (BRACs) in 
Germany ‒ in particular, the effect on criminal activity surrounding the base. Reducing 
crime is a matter of public policy, and any initiative that contributes to this goal, 
whether  inadvertently or deliberately, requires careful study to guide policymakers. 
Within the context of the massive reorganization of the German armed forces, it 
becomes necessary to evaluate the effects of BRACs, not only on defense and strategic 
grounds, but also on outcomes that are perhaps less obvious to the casual observer. 
Accounting for the hidden costs and benefits of such a reorganization is of paramount 
importance in order to avoid basing policy decisions on incomplete information. 
In this regard, the relationship between military bases and the level of local 
criminal activity is murky, and one for which there is a dearth of empirical evidence. 
Part of the challenge relates to the tight connection between crime and the state of the 
local economy, which itself can be affected by the presence of military bases via 
multiple channels. As noted by aus dem Moore and Spitz-Oener (2012), military bases 
affect economic activity through their demand for goods and services, through the Paloyo, Vance & Vorell: Local determinants of crime: Do military bases matter? 
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presence of service-members and their dependents as consumers in the local economy, 
and through the employment of civilian workers. 
Given these positive economic influences, it is perhaps surprising that the overall 
impression gleaned from press reports, particularly from the US, is one of elevated 
crime within the surrounding community owing to the presence of a base.
8 
Nevertheless, academic accounts are often more sanguine. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 
(2001), for example, argue that while reduced military expenditure may increase social 
friction by causing unemployment, it has no immediate impact on crime, once other 
factors, such as demographic composition and alcohol consumption, are controlled for. 
A case study by Thanner (2006) finds local residents in Maryland even deriving a sense 
of security from the base and a perceived increase in crime following its closure, 
attributing this to the loss of the base’s putative deterrence effect. 
However, aus dem Moore (2012) shows that the closures of US military bases in 
Germany reduced drug offenses and rape, although the size of the US bases in Germany 
were much larger than the German bases in our dataset. Ramstein Air Base of the US 
Air Force, for example, has about 60,000 military and civilian personnel, about 7 times 
larger than the largest base in the current paper. In addition, it is difficult to make a 
comparison with the study of American bases since social cohesion is largely 
determined by similarities in culture, including language. American military servicemen 
do not typically share the same culture as the Germans living in communities 
surrounding the base, which may cause more tension than what one may expect from 
German military personnel in Germany. 
Moreover, the closure and drawdown of German military bases did not result in 
the unemployment of service personnel. They were relocated to other bases in the 
country, which means that they were shielded from an unemployment shock. As we 
mention in Paloyo et al. (2010), in a number of areas where German military bases were 
closed, the local government took the opportunity to re-service some of the 
infrastructure, thereby creating employment and perhaps dampening the potential 
negative impacts on the local economy. 
To contribute to this issue, we assembled data from the Federal Criminal Police 
Office (Bundeskriminalamt), Federal and State Statistical Offices (Statistische Ämter 
des Bundes und der Länder), and the Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium 
der Verteidigung). The econometric problem is that we cannot observe the 
counterfactual situation, i.e., we do not know how crime rates would have been if a base 
had not been been present in the community. The closure and realignment procedure, 
which started in 2001, gives us a unique opportunity to overcome this identification 
problem, as it provides us with a natural experiment in which bases were shut down 
                                                            
8 Watson, Bruce, “High crimes: military towns are among the country’s most dangerous”, Daily Finance, 
November 16, 2009. Accessed October 5, 2010. http://goo.gl/2BkK. Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 21 
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solely due to military reasons and requirements, without regard for potential outcomes 
at the community level. A standard fixed-effects regression model is used to account for 
residual concerns about the potential endogeneity of BRACs, although, as will be 
emphasized later in Section  5, there is substantial evidence to suggest that planned 
BRACs were unrelated to the outcome variables of interest. Furthermore, we estimate 
our regression models over data that have been transformed with  geographic 
information system (GIS) software. More explicitly, we create buffer zones that 
surround each base to deal with issues associated with using regional data based on 
politically delineated borders. 
 
 
2. Young men and crime 
The reason we expect a relationship to exist between military bases and the crime rate is 
that young men commit the majority of crimes, and young men comprise the majority 
of the military-base population. The German armed forces (Bundeswehr) are composed 
primarily of men: women comprise a mere 10 percent.
9 
By and large, crime is disproportionately committed by young men. There are a 
variety of reasons for this phenomenon, including economic ones. For example, when 
the economy is in recession, one of the areas of the labor market that is typically and 
severely affected is the segment populated by young, unskilled labor. For instance, 
given the existing employment laws  in Germany, it is easier for firms to shed 
themselves of younger workers with shorter tenure. Conscripts ‒ usually young men 
below the age of 25 ‒ are also generally earning less than the amount they could be 
earning in the civilian labor market. This reduced earnings capacity in the legal labor 
market may tip the balance between licit and illicit activities towards the latter, making 
it more profitable for juveniles and young adults to engage in criminal activity. 
In this case, however, we note that the base closures and realignments in Germany 
did not have a deleterious effect on legal economic opportunities. In previous research 
(Paloyo et al. 2010), we demonstrate that this adjustment process in Germany did not 
have an impact on the regional economy, especially in terms of output, employment, 
and tax revenue (among other economic variables). This is in contrast to the results 
obtained by aus dem Moore (2012) for US bases, but the characteristics of US bases in 
Germany were very different from those of domestic German bases, and it would not be 
an informative comparison, as we have previously mentioned. 
The Bundeskriminalamt in Wiesbaden is responsible for publishing statistics on 
criminal activity and is the source of our data on crime. In Figures 1(a) and 1(b), we 
                                                            
9 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, “Normalität: Frauen in der Bundeswehr”, 24 January 2014. Paloyo, Vance & Vorell: Local determinants of crime: Do military bases matter? 
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plot the total amount of crime and crimes against life known to law enforcement, 
respectively, for Germany for the period 1993‒2009 and disaggregated by the sex of the 
offender. With respect to both categories, the number of male offenders dominate the 
number of female offenders, and even more so when one looks at crimes against life 
(Straftaten gegen das Leben). 
 
Figure 1:  Total crime and crimes against life by sex, 1993‒2009 (Germany) 
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Figure 1:  (Continued) 
 
(b) Crimes against life 
 
Source: Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik: Bundeskriminalamt (2009). 
 
Figures 2(a) to 2(d) show the share of offenders by age group for both total crime 
and crimes against life and separately calculated for men and women. For both sexes, 
young people (those below 21 years old) commit a substantial part of total crime (about 
25 percent). The percentage is somewhat lower for more violent crimes, such as crimes 
against life. For those under 25, their share of total offenses hovers a little below 
40 percent for both men and women, although it is quite clear that young men commit 
the majority of crimes that all men commit, and this is a higher share than the crimes 
committed by young women as a share of crimes committed by all women. Taking into 
account that criminal activities are, for the most part, supplied by young men, it is 
therefore worthwhile to ask whether a concentration of such a group, for instance, in a 
military base, would have an impact on crime in the surrounding community. 
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Figure 2:  Total crime and crimes against life by age group, 1993‒2009 
(Germany) 
 
(a) Total crime, male offenders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Crimes against life, male offenders 
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Figure 2:  (Continued) 
 
(c) Total crime, female offenders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(d) Crimes against life, female offenders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik: Bundeskriminalamt (2009).   
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In terms of convictions for crimes committed by employees of the Bundeswehr 
(among others, conscripts, fixed-term soldiers, and professional soldiers), we obtained 
data from parliamentary inquiries in 2006 and 2008, which are presented in Table 2.
10 
Here, we see that the trend in violent crimes committed by employees of the 
Bundeswehr  seems to follow a similar pattern depicted in Figure 1(b).  We take 
advantage of structural reforms, described in depth in the next section, being undertaken 
in the German Federal Defense Forces to examine the relationship, if any, between the 
presence of a military base and criminal activity surrounding the base. 
 
Table 2:  Convictions for violent crimes of military personnel 
Year 
Number of convictions 
Murder  Manslaughter  Sex crime  Violent crime 
1990  0  3  35  764 
1991  2  0  33  620 
1992  1  4  33  634 
1993  4  1  31  634 
1994  0  1  77  719 
1995  0  0  28  649 
1996  4  3  18  513 
1997  1  2  25  507 
1998  1  0  26  483 
1999  1  1  28  586 
2000  2  1  29  480 
2001  1  0  18  354 
2002  1  2  36  369 
2003  2  0  35  339 
2004  1  1  32  345 
2005  1  0  34  266 
2006  0  1  38  281 
2007  1  1  28  262 
 
Note: The convictions may refer to offenses committed while not associated with the Bundeswehr. 
Source: Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 16/3168, 16/10164. 
   
                                                            
10 It is important to note here that the table lists crimes associated with members of the armed forces at the 
time of the trial. These crimes were not necessarily committed while the accused was in the armed forces. Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 21 
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3. The transformation of the German armed forces 
For Germany, the threat of a border invasion has all but dissipated. This is due to a 
number of factors but primarily because the Cold War has ended, and the European 
Union has established itself as a viable political and economic agglomeration of 
countries. The security threats faced by Germany (and many other countries in the 
Western world) now come from substate and stateless terrorist organizations from as far 
away as Afghanistan and Pakistan. The military deployment strategy that was 
appropriate to defend Germany against an invasion originating from the other side of 
the Iron Curtain is now acknowledged to be insufficient to protect Germany and its 
citizens from organizations that threaten it today.
11 
In response to these changes, new Defense Policy Guidelines 
(Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien) were adopted by the German Parliament in 2003. 
These guidelines emphasized the transition of the German armed forces from a 
territorial defense force into one that could be deployed rapidly and internationally to 
address security concerns abroad. The task of the Bundeswehr  now involves 
“multinational conflict prevention and crisis management operations” while everything 
else “not conducive to this goal is of secondary importance.”
12 The results of such a 
transformation of the Bundeswehr  are evident in the contribution of Germany to 
multinational military operations. For instance, the Commander of the Regional 
Command North of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan 
is German. Next to the US and the UK, Germany is the largest contributor of military 
personnel to the ISAF. This represents a dramatic shift in Germany’s security policy. 
Before the new Defense Policy Guidelines, however, Germany was already 
embarking on the path to rationalize the Bundeswehr. This is embodied in the proposal 
of the Federal Ministry of Defense called the Departmental Deployment Concept 
(Ressortkonzept Stationierung), which was adopted in 2001. This new deployment plan 
involved a substantial military drawdown, including the reduction of military personnel 
and the reduction of the military bases located within Germany. The program, which 
spans the period 2003‒2011, dictates the closure of 187 bases and the reduction of 
personnel in 177 other bases. With this planned reorganization, the federal government 
ultimately intends to reduce the total number of active bases from 575 in 2003 to 388 in 
the year 2011. In Figure 3, we provide a map of the German bases included in our 
study, and indicate those that closed during the study period. 
                                                            
11 To be accurate, such an invasion cannot be completely ruled out. Therefore, the Bundeswehr is being trans-
formed today with this possibility taken into account, which means that should such a “conventional attack” 
become imminent, the armed forces can be reconstituted quickly to respond to and neutralize the threat. The 
whole point of the new defense concept can be seen as one that emphasizes flexibility of the Bundeswehr to 
respond to multiple threats. 
12 BMVg, “The Bundeswehr on a new course”, February 28, 2005. Paloyo, Vance & Vorell: Local determinants of crime: Do military bases matter? 
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Figure 3:  Map of bases in Germany, base closures indicated 
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Former Defense Minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, had proposed a plan to 
even more drastically reduce the size of the Bundeswehr. From its complement of 
245,000 soldiers in 2009, zu Guttenberg intended to cut it down to 163,500 over the 
next few years. The plan also included the suspension of compulsory military service 
and the transformation of the Bundeswehr into a professional army composed of an all-
volunteer force, which is presumably more effective. In addition, the plan raised the 
average number of military personnel in a base to 900, which means the realignment of 
personnel and the closure of redundant bases.
13 
For some bases, downsizing the military complement might prove difficult. 
Consider the top 10 Gemeinden (municipalities or towns; LAU 2, formerly NUTS 5) by 
military personnel presented in Table 3. In 2003, the base in Koblenz employed 8,830 
persons, which represented about 8 percent of the population in that area in 2003. 
However, in the same year, the average military complement for a base is about 324 
individuals. Thus, to achieve the target, the realignment of personnel will have to be 
substantial. 
 
Table 3:  Top 10 Gemeinden by military personnel complement in 2003 
Gemeinde  Kreis 
Personnel 
  Share in 
population 
2003  2007    2003  2007 
Koblenz  Koblenz  8,830  8,830    0.0819  0.0832 
Düsseldorf  Düsseldorf  3,020  3,020    0.0053  0.0052 
Hammelburg  Bad Kissingen  2,490  1,830    0.0228  0.0172 
Penzing  Landsberg am Lech  2,360  2,360    0.0215  0.0208 
Sigmaringen  Sigmaringen  2,200  1,670    0.0164  0.0126 
Strausberg  Märkisch-Oderland  2,200  2,200    0.0115  0.0115 
Regensburg  Regensburg  2,140  2,140    0.0167  0.0162 
Stetten am kalten Markt  Sigmaringen  2,080  2,080    0.0155  0.0157 
Memmingerberg  Unterallgäu  2,036  0    0.0150  0.0000 
Kappeln  Schleswig-Flensburg  1,950  0    0.0098  0.0000 
 
Source: Stationierungskonzept der Bundeswehr 2004. 
   
                                                            
13 Müller, Albrecht, “Changes coming as Bundeswehr faces budget cuts”, Defense News, May 27, 2010. 
Accessed September 3, 2010. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4646605. Paloyo, Vance & Vorell: Local determinants of crime: Do military bases matter? 
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4. Data description 
The dataset used in our analysis contains 298 bases, of which 105 were eventually 
closed.
14 Table 4 presents a timeline of base closures by federal state. The number of 
base closures per year was increasing since the start of the program and culminated in 
2007, when 43 bases were closed. Bayern had the highest number of bases at 50 and 
also the most number of base closures at 17. 
 
Table 4:  Timeline of base closures by Federal State 
Federal state  Bases 
Number of base closures by year 
Bases closed 
2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Bayern  50  0  2  2  7  6  17 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  43  0  1  6  6  3  16 
Schleswig Holstein  39  0  3  4  2  5  14 
Rheinland-Pfalz  36  0  0  1  9  7  17 
Niedersachsen  35  0  0  3  2  6  11 
Baden-Württemberg  29  0  0  0  3  5  8 
Hessen  23  0  2  1  2  4  9 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  19  0  1  0  0  4  5 
Brandenburg  13  0  2  1  1  0  4 
Thüringen  6  0  0  0  0  2  2 
Saarland  4  0  0  1  0  0  1 
Sachsen  1  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Total  298  0  11  19  32  43  105 
 
Source: Stationierungskonzept der Bundeswehr 2004. 
 
The data on crime were obtained from the Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik published 
annually by the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt 2009).
15  Apart 
from the total criminal offenses known to law enforcement, the publication also has 
crime disaggregated by the type of crime. Other socioeconomic variables were drawn 
from the Federal and State Statistical Offices (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der 
Länder 2008). The data are recorded at the Kreis level (NUTS 3), the Kreis being an 
administrative region in Germany with an average area of 814 sq. km. Information 
pertaining to the military bases was collected from the Deployment Concept of the 
                                                            
14 Missing information in any of the covariates used later in the regression analysis necessitated dropping 
certain bases from the dataset. 
15 The crime statistics are collected by the German Federal Police. Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 21 
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Federal Armed Forces of Germany (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2004). The 
location information on the bases is provided at the Gemeinde level, the Gemeinde 
being smaller than the Kreis to which it belongs. Each Gemeinde is located in only one 
Kreis (i.e., the former's border does not cross the latter’s). 
The classification of criminal offenses into various categories is done by the 
Federal Criminal Police Office. In this study, we use the following specific categories: 
(i) total crimes (Straftaten insgesamt) comprise all crimes but without offenses against 
residence, asylum, or free-movement-of-persons regulations (for instance, staying 
illegally in Germany, having no passport, etc.); (ii) drug-related crimes 
(Rauschgiftdelikte) are all direct offenses related to illicit drugs: selling, buying, 
possessing with intent, as well as indirect offenses like robbery and breaking and 
entering to gain access to drugs or to finance a drug addiction, and driving under the 
influence of drugs; (iii) violent crimes (Körperverletzung) are murder, manslaughter, 
rape, assault, threatening with assault or bodily harm, hostage-taking and, in general, all 
violent exchanges between persons, normally with intent; (iv) breaking and entering 
(Wohnungseinbruchdiebstahl) includes breaking and entering, stealing or its attempt, 
and all related offenses, like damaging windows, doors, etc.; (v) stealing from cars 
(Diebstahl in/aus Kraftfahrzeuge) is actual stealing of cars and stealing from cars with 
intent (but not related to drugs; otherwise, it would be recorded in drug-related crimes). 
In general, violent crime is reserved for more serious cases. The categories are 
exclusive, i.e., crimes are not counted in more than one group. If a person commits a 
combination of crimes, say, running over someone to get money for drugs, the most 
serious offense is recorded. Typically, when a violent crime is committed together with 
a property crime, the event is counted under the latter category.
16 The list of crimes in 
the dataset is not exhaustive, and in all cases, the sum of the different crime variables 
that are available does not equal the total number of crimes for a particular area. 
The data are spatial in nature, which we take into account by transforming the data 
first before assembling and preparing it for estimation. Spatially explicit data are 
becoming increasingly common in demographic research, a development that has thrust 
the issue of geographic scale into greater prominence. As defined by Reardon et al. 
(2008:489), geographic scale refers to “the dimensions of identifiable social or physical 
features of a landscape”. The ability to delineate such features is, of course, 
circumscribed by the level of spatial aggregation at which the data are measured. When 
measured at the most disaggregated level, units of observation can be located in space 
by their exact geographic coordinates, thereby affording a high degree of flexibility in 
how spatial influences are incorporated into the analysis. In a study of psychoactive 
substance use, for example, Chaix et al. (2005) take advantage of information on the 
exact residential location of individuals in the city of Malmö, Sweden using geo-
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coordinates to create circular but non-uniform areas of constant population size 
centered on each individual. 
The data used in the present analysis do not benefit from this degree of precision 
but are still measured at a sufficiently fine geographic scale to capture economic 
conditions surrounding the base. Using  GIS software, we create buffer zones  ‒ 
uniformly sized circular areas with the base at its center ‒ to take into account the 
information from the surrounding Kreise. To do this, we first draw a buffer zone around 
the centroid of the Gemeinde where the base is located.
17 The area of overlap for each 
Kreise contained in this buffer zone is calculated and then divided by the total area of 
the buffer zone. The resulting ratio is used to weight the information assigned to that 
Kreis. This allows us to compute a weighted sum that summarizes the available 
information from the surrounding Kreise  of a particular base. This approach, also 
favored by Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) for applications to US census data, incorporates 
the information from the home and surrounding Kreise. It ameliorates some of the 
difficulties associated with the so-called modifiable areal-unit problem (Openshaw 
1984), such as the use of varying and arbitrarily sized spatial units of analysis. 
Consider, for instance, the case depicted in Figure 4. Here, the Gemeinde 
(crosshatch pattern) is located at the edge of its home Kreis (gray). If we were to take 
into account ‒ using the method described above ‒ that it shares the border with two 
other  Kreise, we would calculate total crime associated with that military base as 
follows: 
 
total_crime𝑗
weighted = ��
overlap_area𝑖
total_area_buffer𝑗
× total_crime𝑖�
3
𝑖=1
, 
 
 
where 𝑖 and 𝑗 are the Kreis (where the base is located) and buffer zone, respectively. 
For our purposes, we set the radius of the buffer zones to 12 km and 20 km. This allows 
us to roughly determine how far from the centroid the effect, if any, travels. 
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Figure 4:  GIS-based calculation of the variables, 12-km buffer zone 
 
 
 
Note: This base is located in Hammelburg, Bad Kissingen in the state of Bayern. 
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One drawback in processing the data this way is the assumption that the surfaces 
are isotropic, i.e., that the magnitude of the effect emanating from the centroid is 
invariant with respect to direction. This is problematic when the politically delineated 
borders are the result of natural features such as mountains and rivers, over which the 
effects may not necessarily propagate as easily as over plains. Therefore, we also 
estimate  our model using untransformed data, i.e., without the buffer-zone 
transformation, to check the robustness of our results. We also present estimates using a 
20-kilometer buffer to gauge the extent to which the modifiable areal-unit problem may 
bear on the results. 
While we have every reason to believe that the decision pertaining to which bases 
will be closed is based purely on strategic grounds, we nevertheless perform an 
equality-of-means test between areas where bases closed and areas where bases stayed 
open to show that these bases do not differ in their observed characteristics. This 
implies that, at least in terms of the observable elements, the places with base closures 
are comparable to those places without base closures. We perform the test for two 
years: specifically, 2003, where the bases are first observed in the dataset, and 2007, 
where they are last observed. The results are displayed in Table 5. They indicate that 
there is no substantial difference between the areas where a base closed and the areas 
where bases remained open, which makes a comparison between the two groups more 
credible. 
 
Table 5:  Equality-of-means test, 2003 and 2007 
Variable 
2003 
p-value 
2007 
p-
value 
With 
closure 
No 
closure 
With 
closure 
No 
closure 
Panel A: 12-km buffer zone           
Crime rate (all crimes) × 10,000  635.70  648.65  0.5521  621.50  628.32 0.7319 
Annual real household income  17,074.11  17,330.70  0.2698  19,941.70 20,299.21 0.3812 
Unemployed ÷ population  0.0454  0.0483  0.3026  0.0389  0.0410 0.3604 
Foreigners ÷ population  0.0615  0.0646  0.4352  0.0611  0.0639 0.4625 
Males aged 15‒25 ÷ population  0.0603  0.0602  0.9173  0.0605  0.0599 0.2064 
Real GNP (in 100,000)  50.2975  54.6876  0.4588  47.0718  51.0428 0.4691 
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Table 5:  (Continued) 
Variable 
2003 
p-value 
2007 
p-
value 
With 
closure 
No 
closure 
With 
closure 
No 
closure 
Panel B: 20-km buffer zone           
Crime rate (all crimes) × 10,000  624.98  636.08  0.5842  610.62  617.69  0.6994 
Annual real household income  17,007.65 17,263.16  0.2571  19,940.65 20,248.93  0.4286 
Unemployed ÷ population  0.0451  0.0479  0.3013  0.0388  0.0408  0.3879 
Foreigners ÷ population  0.0608  0.0633  0.4978  0.0606  0.0627  0.5519 
Males aged 15‒25 ÷ population  0.0601  0.0602  0.9088  0.0605  0.0601  0.2935 
Real GNP (in 100,000)  51.3316  54.9975  0.5034  48.3141  51.4668  0.5354 
             
Panel C: Untransformed data           
Crime rate (all crimes) × 10,000  680.49  684.45  0.8989  669.22  659.80  0.7412 
Annual real household income  17,116.79 17,429.73  0.2308  19,897.89 20,327.90  0.3386 
Unemployed ÷ population  0.0462  0.0489  0.3422  0.0396  0.0419  0.3480 
Foreigners ÷ population  0.0665  0.0668  0.9485  0.0662  0.0661  0.9886 
Males aged 15‒25 ÷ population  0.0602  0.0601  0.9315  0.0605  0.0599  0.2599 
Real GNP (in 100,000)  45.1935  50.1877  0.3111  42.4847  46.6024  0.3616 
Observations  105  193    105  193   
 
Note: Income and GNP are in euro. The p-values are based on two-sided t-tests. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
In light of  the seminal studies of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), we 
hypothesize that variables that increase either economic well-being or the likelihood of 
arrest serve as deterrents to crime. More precisely, anything that increases the returns to 
licit activities relative to illicit activities should reduce the propensity to commit crime. 
Variables that relate to these opportunities are also therefore included in the regression 
model described in detail below. These include real GNP and relative disposable 
income. Conversely, variables that undermine social cohesion or economic security are 
hypothesized to increase the crime level, such as the percentage of foreigners and of the 
unemployed.
18 In addition, we expect positive relationships between (i) the number of 
foreigners and crime and (ii) the number of young men and crime owing to a higher 
incidence of economic duress and exclusion from the labor market within these groups. 
Being located in East Germany is also hypothesized to be associated with higher levels 
of crime, given a sustained period of depressed economic conditions in that region. 
Finally, as large populations have generally been found to be associated with higher 
                                                            
18 For Europe, Semyonov et al. (2012) demonstrate that perceived safety is affected by the percentage of 
migrants. In particular, neighborhoods with a large share of non-European ethnic minorities have the lowest 
perception of safety. Paloyo, Vance & Vorell: Local determinants of crime: Do military bases matter? 
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crime, we expect a positive coefficient for this variable (United States Department of 
Justice 2009).
19 
 
 
5. Estimation strategy and results 
To identify the impact of adjustments in the size of military bases, including closures, 
we estimate the following regression model: 
 
ln𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝗼 + 𝗿DP𝑖𝑡 + 𝗃′𝐱𝑖𝑡 + 𝗉′𝐳𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡,               (1) 
 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a generic outcome variable (here, total crime and its subcategories) for unit 
𝑖 in year 𝑡, DP𝑖𝑡 is the number of military personnel in thousands (Dienstposten), 𝐱𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of control variables, 𝐳𝑡 is a vector of unit-invariant year fixed effects, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 a 
stochastic disturbance term with the usual properties. The coefficients 𝗼, 𝗿, 𝗃, and 𝗉 are 
a set of parameters and parameter vectors to be estimated. The coefficient of interest is 
𝗿, which represents the causal effect of BRACs on criminal activity surrounding the 
base. 
We exploit the panel structure of the dataset by augmenting Equation (1) with a 
time-invariant and buffer-specific (or, in the case of the untransformed data, Kreis-
specific) fixed effect: 
 
ln𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝗼 + 𝗿DP𝑖𝑡 + 𝗃′𝐱𝑖𝑡 + 𝗉′𝐳𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡.               (2) 
 
 
The term 𝜙𝑖 represents unobserved community-specific characteristics that affect 
the outcome variable but do not change over time. For instance, certain geographic 
characteristics are captured by 𝜙𝑖. Allowing for the possibility that this term is 
correlated with 𝑒𝑖𝑡, we proceed to apply a fixed-effect transformation to the data to 
eliminate any residual biases. 
As noted in the introduction, one important institutional aspect is that the decision 
to close or downsize a military base was made purely on strategic grounds that were 
unrelated to the intensity of criminal activity surrounding the selected base. As opposed 
to the US experience, where the execution of the base closures was substantially 
influenced by the demands of the local communities in which bases were  located 
                                                            
19 These variables broadly capture the same socioeconomic conditions as the “structural covariates” used in 
the study of Messner et al. (2013), although these authors were more interested in the spatial distribution of 
crime across Germany. Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 21 
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(Brauer  and  Marlin  1992), the military drawdown in Germany was not altered by 
popular or political considerations. The planning period of the scheme covered two 
government periods and both major political parties. The overarching shift from 
territorial defense to expeditionary warfare drove the decision-making process. No 
planned base closure was taken back or altered, and there was no formal process for 
local communities to appeal the decision of the federal government.
20 This peculiar 
aspect of the implementation of the Deployment Concept of the armed forces in 
Germany enables us to recover the causal impact of BRACs. 
The outcome variables used in this study are the following: total crime, breaking 
and entering, automobile-related crime, violent crime, and drug-related crime. These are 
all set to logarithm so that the coefficients can be directly interpreted as semi-elastic 
elements. The control variables contained in 𝐱𝑖𝑡 are an indicator variable that equals 1 
for East Germany and 0 otherwise (this is eliminated in the fixed-effects model through 
the within transformation), real GNP in million euro (lagged one year), the percentage 
of the unemployed in the community, the share of foreigners in the community, the 
percentage  of young men (aged 15‒25 years old) in the community, household 
disposable income relative to the national mean (lagged one year), and population in ten 
thousands. All control variables are measured at the level of the Kreis. 
Estimates of the coefficients based on Equations (1)  and (2) are presented in 
Tables 6 and 7, respectively. Both tables use the GIS-transformed data with the 12-
kilometer buffer. The appendix presents results using a 20-kilometer buffer as well as 
the untransformed data.  Based on OLS regressions, we note that the presence of 
military personnel has no evident impact on crime levels across most of the measured 
categories. The one exception is drug-related crimes, with a point estimate [standard 
error] of  0.041 [0.022]. Specifically, the coefficient suggests that a 1,000-person 
increase in military personnel is associated with a 4.1-percent increase in drug-related 
crimes ‒ a seemingly small effect that, as presented below, is not robust to the inclusion 
of fixed effects. 
                                                            
20 In addition, the authors met with the officer and members of his team in charge of the base realignments 
and closures in Germany at that time. He was explicit in claiming that the decision on which bases to close 
was based purely on strategic concerns. Paloyo, Vance & Vorell: Local determinants of crime: Do military bases matter? 
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Table 6:  OLS regression results (12-km buffer) 
 
Dependent variables (to logarithm) 
Total 
crime 
Breaking 
and 
entering 
Auto-
related 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Drug-
related 
crime 
Military personnel ÷ 1,000  0.021  0.026  0.040  0.017  0.041* 
  [0.013]  [0.024]  [0.025]  [0.015]  [0.022] 
Real GNP ÷ 1,000,000 (lagged)  −0.031***  −0.080***  −0.081***  −0.020**  −0.002 
  [0.011]  [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.009]  [0.011] 
Household relative income 
(lagged) 
−0.976*** 
[0.223] 
−1.168*** 
[0.399] 
−1.164*** 
[0.430] 
−0.761*** 
[0.194] 
−1.672*** 
[0.348] 
Share of foreigners  3.805***  3.389**  4.364***  2.601***  8.452*** 
  [0.975]  [1.558]  [1.624]  [0.817]  [1.139] 
Share of unemployed  5.338***  10.200***  13.416***  5.396***  −4.546** 
  [1.469]  [2.659]  [3.035]  [1.219]  [1.996] 
Share of men aged 15‒25  −21.804*** −58.139***  −40.227***  −19.192***  −3.144 
  [3.722]  [6.336]  [7.733]  [3.301]  [4.899] 
Population ÷ 10,000  0.059***  0.091***  0.095***  0.048***  0.041*** 
  [0.004]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.003]  [0.005] 
East Germany  0.102  −0.078  −0.237  −0.167**  0.046 
  [0.100]  [0.171]  [0.215]  [0.082]  [0.128] 
Constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-statistic  80.88  72.19  87.51  126.49  100.70 
R
2  0.8562  0.7552  0.7519  0.8317  0.6834 
Observations  1,192  1,192  1,192  1,192  1,192 
 
Note: The dependent variables are the number of offenses per crime category and are expressed in logarithm. 
Bracketed numbers are robust standard errors clustered at the buffer level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Of the remaining coefficient estimates, the majority that is statistically significant 
has  signs that are consistent  with expectations based on the existing literature. 
Economic well-being, as measured by real GNP and relative disposable  income, is 
negatively associated with crime, while higher unemployment has a positive 
association. Also confirming  expectations, regions with a higher percentage  of 
foreigners have higher crime levels. (Entorf and Spengler 2000)  These are also 
consistent with the results obtained by Messner et al. (2013:1015) in their “exploratory 
spatial data analysis” ‒ that is, areas within Germany with “high robbery and assault 
rates tend to be those with comparatively high levels of socioeconomic deprivation”. 
The fixed-effects estimates presented in Table 7 mitigate biases arising from time-
invariant unobservable variables that are contemporaneously correlated with the error Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 21 
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term. On the whole, the qualitative findings  do not vary markedly. With regard to 
military personnel, the results confirm the impression gleaned from the OLS estimates 
that this variable is not significantly correlated with crime. The most notable 
discrepancy is seen for the coefficient estimate for the number of young men, which 
now has the expected positive coefficient in each of the models. 
 
Table 7:  FE regression results (12-km buffer) 
 
Dependent variables (to logarithm) 
Total 
crime 
Breaking 
and 
entering 
Auto-
related 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Drug-
related 
crime 
Military personnel ÷ 1,000  −0.016  −0.030  −0.022  0.005  0.057 
  [0.016]  [0.058]  [0.069]  [0.013]  [0.042] 
Real GNP ÷ 1,000,000 
(lagged) 
−0.014 
[0.015] 
−0.152*** 
[0.053] 
−0.098* 
[0.058] 
0.033* 
[0.020] 
0.087** 
[0.036] 
Household relative income 
(lagged) 
−0.446 
[0.283] 
−1.643* 
[0.976] 
−1.823* 
[1.059] 
−0.092 
[0.375] 
−4.129*** 
[1.158] 
Percentage of foreigners  3.677**  16.788***  6.762  3.688**  16.734*** 
  [1.542]  [5.310]  [5.725]  [1.766]  [5.730] 
Percentage of unemployed  2.021***  −1.136  2.420  2.931***  3.346 
  [0.745]  [2.788]  [2.829]  [1.018]  [3.149] 
Percentage of men aged 15‒
25 
6.608*** 
[1.394] 
3.205** 
[5.097] 
11.863** 
[5.155] 
3.768** 
[1.995] 
7.468 
[5.384] 
Population ÷ 10,000  0.019***  0.090***  0.086***  −0.003  −0.083*** 
  [0.010]  [0.028]  [0.034]  [0.021]  [0.025] 
Constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-statistic  20.05  18.58  58.99  40.13  16.91 
Within R
2  0.1861  0.1046  0.3284  0.2585  0.1908 
Observations  1,192  1,192  1,192  1,192  1,192 
 
Note: The dependent variables are the number of offenses per crime category and are expressed in logarithm. 
Bracketed numbers are robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
The reorganization of the German armed forces is arguably the most massive 
reconfiguration of the country’s military since World War II, with potentially profound 
implications both geopolitically and at the local level in communities where military Paloyo, Vance & Vorell: Local determinants of crime: Do military bases matter? 
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bases are located. Among the effects plausibly instigated by a base closure is a change 
in the intensity of criminal activities. To the extent that the personnel who populate the 
bases are largely comprised of young men ‒ the demographic segment most prone to 
criminal activity ‒ it is conceivable that the closures would reduce crime rates. Given 
the substantial financial and psychic costs of crime, such an outcome would register as 
a clear benefit to communities otherwise concerned about the economic impacts of the 
closures. This paper has attempted to empirically address this issue by assembling a 
panel dataset that links regional crime rates to military base  complements and 
socioeconomic variables. 
While our analysis confirms the significance of many of the correlates of crime 
identified elsewhere in the literature, including the population, unemployment rate, the 
presence of young men, and measures of local economic well-being, we find no 
evidence for an association of crime with the military bases. This conclusion holds over 
different estimation methods and different scales of analysis. 
In deriving policy implications  from these findings, we would avoid making 
claims about any relationship between criminal behavior and military service at the 
individual level; such questions could only be addressed with micro-level data. This is 
an important limitation of the study, and it deserves to be emphasized. As the data that 
we use is regional in nature, we are unable to disentangle the direct and indirect effects 
of a base closure because we are unable to observe if a particular person committed a 
crime. Nevertheless, as a matter of regional public policy, our findings strongly suggest 
that base closures or the reallocation of military personnel across bases, will have no 
effect on the crime level in the communities affected. 
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Appendix: Supplemental regression tables 
Table A1:  OLS regression results (20-km buffer) 
 
Dependent variables (to logarithm) 
Total 
crime 
Breaking 
and 
entering 
Auto-
related 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Drug-
related 
crime 
Military personnel ÷ 1,000  0.014  0.021  0.019  0.016  0.046** 
  [0.013]  [0.022]  [0.022]  [0.014]  [0.023] 
Real GNP ÷ 1,000,000 
(lagged) 
−0.033*** 
[0.012] 
−0.084*** 
[0.017] 
−0.092*** 
[0.016] 
−0.024** 
[0.011] 
0.001 
[0.010] 
Household relative income 
(lagged) 
−0.580* 
[0.322] 
−0.674 
[0.441] 
−0.497 
[0.546] 
−0.198 
[0.303] 
−1.366*** 
[0.409] 
Percentage of foreigners  3.112***  3.103**  3.445**  1.237  8.066*** 
  [1.030]  [1.542]  [1.660]  [0.840]  [1.240] 
Percentage of unemployed  6.667***  13.435***  17.189***  5.898***  −3.878** 
  [1.651]  [2.723]  [3.209]  [1.434]  [1.946] 
Percentage of men aged 15-
25 
−18.045*** 
[4.468] 
−54.022*** 
[6.308] 
−37.907*** 
[8.238] 
−16.625*** 
[3.858] 
1.241 
[4.697] 
Population ÷ 10,000  0.060***  0.091***  0.097***  0.051***  0.041*** 
  [0.003]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.003]  [0.004] 
East Germany  0.017  −0.303*  −0.446**  −0.151  −0.006 
  [0.109]  [0.172]  [0.217]  [0.099]  [0.115] 
Constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-statistic  127.81  102.07  119.73  199.94  134.27 
R
2  0.8794  0.7831  0.7830  0.8591  0.7240 
Observations  1,192  1,192  1,192  1,192  1,192 
 
Note: The dependent variables are the number of offenses per crime category and are expressed in logarithm. 
Bracketed numbers are robust standard errors clustered at the buffer level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Table A2:  FE regression results (20-km buffer) 
 
Dependent variables (to logarithm) 
Total 
crime 
Breaking 
and 
entering 
Auto-
related 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Drug-
related 
crime 
Military personnel ÷ 1,000  −0.010  −0.021  −0.012  0.002  0.036 
  [0.014]  [0.053]  [0.064]  [0.011]  [0.037] 
Real GNP ÷ 1,000,000 
(lagged) 
−0.003 
[0.016] 
−0.095 
[0.050] 
−0.079 
[0.055] 
0.065*** 
[0.013] 
0.054* 
[0.030] 
Household relative income 
(lagged) 
−0.445 
[0.298] 
2.510** 
[1.025] 
−1.742 
[1.190] 
−0.208 
[0.373] 
−5.374*** 
[1.080] 
Percentage of foreigners  4.416***  19.783***  4.257  5.463***  19.747*** 
  [1.430]  [4.582]  [5.182]  [1.592]  [5.053] 
Percentage of unemployed  2.381***  −0.547  4.019  3.764***  2.142 
  [0.702]  [2.628]  [2.884]  [0.886]  [2.962] 
Percentage of men aged 15‒
25 
5.776*** 
[1.342] 
2.979 
[4.913] 
8.900* 
[5.000] 
3.017* 
[1.797] 
11.123** 
[4.922] 
Population ÷ 10,000  0.036***  0.024***  0.052***  −0.015**  −0.010 
  [0.005]  [0.009]  [0.015]  [0.006]  [0.010] 
Constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-statistic  38.28  30.67  77.48  58.41  19.27 
Within R
2  0.3094  0.1260  0.3619  0.3140  0.2646 
Observations  1,192  1,192  1,192  1,192  1,192 
 
Note: The dependent variables are the number of offenses per crime category and are expressed in logarithm. 
Bracketed numbers are robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Table A3:  OLS regression results (Untransformed data) 
 
Dependent variables (to logarithm) 
Total 
crime 
Breaking 
and 
entering 
Auto-
related 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Drug-
related 
crime 
Military personnel ÷ 1,000  0.042*  0.030  0.079**  0.031*  0.063** 
  [0.021]  [0.032]  [0.039]  [0.018]  [0.025] 
Real GNP ÷ 1,000,000 
(lagged) 
0.001 
[0.007] 
0.019 
[0.012] 
−0.011 
[0.010] 
−0.002 
[0.007] 
-0.007 
[0.012] 
Household relative income 
(lagged) 
−0.734*** 
[0.156] 
−0.583* 
[0.334] 
−0.671** 
[0.335] 
−0.846*** 
[0.166] 
−1.359*** 
[0.294] 
Percentage of foreigners  2.366***  1.055  1.616  2.268***  6.751*** 
  [0.527]  [1.106]  [1.103]  [0.638]  [1.102] 
Percentage of unemployed  7.053***  10.812***  13.819***  6.913***  −2.253 
  [1.620]  [2.843]  [3.045]  [1.492]  [2.079] 
Percentage of men aged 15‒
25 
−11.845*** 
[3.261] 
−42.054*** 
[6.563] 
−22.976*** 
[7.015] 
−11.877*** 
[3.498] 
1.510 
[5.637] 
Population ÷ 10,000  0.048***  0.073***  0.074***  0.042***  0.040*** 
  [0.003]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.003]  [0.005] 
East Germany  −0.050  −0.209  −0.393*  −0.330**  −0.108* 
  [0.111]  [0.199]  [0.219]  [0.102]  [0.152] 
Constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-statistic  68.65  53.55  78.70  66.73  38.92 
R
2  0.7973  0.6830  0.6859  0.7497  0.5360 
Observations  1,192  1,192  1,192  1,192  1,192 
 
Note: The dependent variables are the number of offenses per crime category and are expressed in logarithm. 
Bracketed numbers are robust standard errors clustered at the buffer level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
   Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 21 
http://www.demographic-research.org  657 
Table A4:  FE regression results (Untransformed data) 
 
Dependent variables (to logarithm) 
Total 
crime 
Breaking 
and 
entering 
Auto-
related 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Drug-
related 
crime 
Military personnel ÷ 
1,000 
−0.015 
[0.019] 
−0.043 
[0.060] 
−0.007 
[0.081] 
0.000 
[0.015] 
0.079 
[0.048] 
Real GNP ÷ 1,000,000 
(lagged) 
−0.012 
[0.012] 
−0.052 
[0.047] 
−0.019 
[0.051] 
−0.032* 
[0.019] 
0.023 
[0.035] 
Household relative 
income (lagged) 
−0.246 
[0.205] 
−0.810 
[0.948] 
−0.794 
[1.002] 
−0.360 
[0.358] 
−2.408** 
[1.010] 
Percentage of 
foreigners 
3.243* 
[1.740] 
13.372** 
[6.323] 
8.145 
[6.156] 
2.178 
[1.718] 
10.496 
[6.676] 
Percentage of 
unemployed 
1.686** 
[0.828] 
−0.968 
[3.051] 
1.959 
[3.026] 
3.152*** 
[0.988] 
1.806 
[3.119] 
Percentage of men 
aged 15‒25 
6.680*** 
[1.757] 
5.251 
[5.960] 
13.380** 
[6.237] 
4.462** 
[1.899] 
6.589 
[5.882] 
Population ÷ 10,000  0.011  0.063  −0.002  0.014  −0.139** 
  [0.019]  [0.062]  [0.071]  [0.025]  [0.058] 
Constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-statistic  15.03  9.85  34.97  21.62  10.57 
Within R
2  0.1349  0.0729  0.2649  0.1674  0.1197 
Observations  1,192  1,192  1,192  1,192  1,192 
 
Note: The dependent variables are the number of offenses per crime category and are expressed in logarithm. 
Bracketed numbers are robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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